Settling the FISA Dispute – Objectively

February 18, 2008

I’ve debated heavily whether or not I should blog on this topic, particularly as it has entered the political arena where I wish to stay out of. Yet I can no longer stand on the sidelines as news stories, blogs, and websites continue to show the propensity to inaccurately portray the issue (sites such as media matters, USA Today, and the New York Times) dividing people’s opinions on the matter along party lines. This issue has been grossly misrepresented in the media and blogosphere, and I hope this entry will rectify the disinformation. All of these false accusations and allegations by both sides stem from one erroneous assertion: that the Protect America Act (PAA) revised the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) to expand the government’s authority to eavesdrop on Americans’ domestic-to-foreign communications without a warrant. This is absolutely false. The following is an objective look at the FISA debate. I do not address the issue of granting immunity to telecommunication companies who responded to lawful requests by the government.

Before 1978, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency were tapping the phones of U.S. citizens–people like Dr. Martin Luther King, protesters of the Vietnam War, etc.–based on the logic that the U.S. government was authorized to tap the telephone of foreign powers or agents of a foreign power. So the system was being abused. In 1978, FISA was established to prescribe the procedures for the physical and electronic surveillance and collection of “foreign intelligence information” between or among “foreign powers” on territory under United States control. The Act was amended by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 to include non-state actors who inherently are not directly supported by a foreign government. As designed, the law protects the U.S. from foreign/terrorist security threats as well as the civil liberties of persons located in the U.S. Essentially, the law said “if you conduct surveillance in the United States, you’ve got to get a warrant from a special FISA court.”

The law was never designed to require a warrant to conduct surveillance against a foreign target outside the United States. This is where the problem arose. FISA contained provisions tied to specific communication technologies–wire. At that time, there was no Internet and no cell phones–global communication was done through (wireless) satellite relay. Since the Act’s passage, telecommunications technology has significantly changed. Now approximately 90% of the world communication is on fiber optic cables (wire), which will very likely pass through the U.S., which requires a warrant under the law. Thus, the Intelligence Community has been bringing cases before the FISA court for which it was never designed. The newly created Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which was established after 9/11 to coordinate the activities of the 16 agencies of the intelligence community, recognized this problem. The Director, Michael McConnell, brought this issue to Congress in 2007, and led effort to amend the Act, which was subsequently accomplished through the Protect America Act (PAA) of 2007. This law allowed wiretapping without a warrant when the target of surveillance is a “foreign intelligence target” located outside the United States, but, in a compromise with Democrats, contained a sunset provision for the new Act.

So, regardless of the mudslinging back and forth, a warrant is still required if surveillance is to be conducted against a U.S. person, period.

See Also:

1. http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070802_release.pdf
2. http://fas.org/irp/news/2007/04/doj041307.pdf

 


Re: Don Kerr: Call Charlie Allen

November 12, 2007

Michael Tanji blogged recently about Don Kerr’s recent statements that privacy no longer can mean anonymity. While I often find myself agreeing with Tanji’s assessment on current national security related issues, I disagree with his assessment that Don Kerr believes Americans must surrender their privacy for government to ensure their safety. In fact, the very proposal that Michael suggests as an alternative to Kerr (i.e., assigning a unique identifier to be used in place of a real name so whether you’re an FBI Special Agent or NSA analyst, you can talk about an entity freely because you’re not violating “anyone’s” privacy) to me is exactly what Don Kerr was saying. The definition of privacy may no longer mean anonymity–because we give up the what, when, where, and how everyday with daily transactions. Bottom line: I think Donald Kerr is saying we have to think about privacy differently, and not in terms of anonymity, and if we do so, privacy and security need not be paradoxical forces. The rise of one does not mean the unraveling of the other. Both are achievable. Let there be no dobut: the U.S. must continue the legacy of protecting the rights of Americans.


Regarding a post on Jeff Jonas’ blog on a “Total Surveillance Society”

October 13, 2007

Jeff Jonas’ blog “Six Ticks till Midnight: One Plausible Journey from Here to a Total Surveillance Society” is a good read if you’re interested in the topic of surveillance or civil liberties. It’s sad to say, but it’s somewhat unavoidable. “If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em” is the phrase that comes to mind. The dawning of a new world is indeed on the horizon. Government needs to catch up–it’s as if everything is being rewritten. Your choice is to either stand on the sidelines and watch everything “that is” become everything “that was,” or become a part of this tranformation and help mold it.